Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games by Martín-Herrán, G. & Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo
Abstr
areas
severEfficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory
and application to dynamic fishery games
G. Martı´n-Herra´n, J.P. Rinco´n-Zapatero
Departamento de Economı´a Aplicada, Facultad de Ciencias Econo´micas, Universidad de Valladolid, Avda.
Valle Esgueva 6, 47011 Valladolid, SpainactIn this paper, we present a method for the characterization of Markov perfect Nash
equilibria being Pareto efficient in non-linear differential games. For that purpose, we use a
new method for computing Nash equilibria with Markov strategies by means of a system of
quasilinear partial differential equations. We apply the necessary and sufficient conditions
derived to characterize efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria to dynamic fishery games.
JEL classification: C73; Q22
Keywords: Differential games; Markov perfect Nash equilibria; Pareto optimum; Quasilinear partial
differential equations; Fishery management
1. Introduction
The interdependence between the decisions of the agents is well known in many
of economics. Game theory is a useful tool to study these situations involving
al decision makers. An interesting question is to determine whether the noncooperative solution presents the property of Pareto efficiency. The question is
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whether a cooperative behavior can emerge without any binding agreements between
the agents. The efficiency of Nash equilibrium is a very uncommon feature, but at the
same time a very desirable property, since it makes the efficient solution self-
enforcing. If, moreover, the Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect, the efficient
solution can be enforced for any initial condition during the course of the game.
If a priori efficiency is not at hand, a standard method to implement cooperative
solutions by means of non-cooperative play is to construct efficient Markov perfect
Nash equilibria (MPNE) based on trigger strategies, as in Haurie and Pohjola (1987)
or Tolwinski et al. (1986). Within the limits of differential games theory, this
approach presents technical problems because trigger strategies are in general
discontinuous and needs the introduction of memory strategies for the players. These
strategies are based on all past information of the game evolution to the current
time, and as a consequence, this kind of strategies are non-Markovian. Another
option is the use of incentive strategies, establishing the efficient solution as an
incentive equilibrium (see, for example, Ehtamo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1989, 1993;
Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2001).
It is important to note that the attainment of the cooperative solution as a Nash
equilibrium of a non-cooperative game will depend on what set of strategies is
available to the players. For that reason, this paper proposes a new approach that
allows to identify games where the MPNE based on Markov strategies is Pareto
efficient. This new approach is based on the characterization of MPNE as solutions
to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This system is obtained from
the optimality conditions of the maximum principle. The quasilinear system is fully
equivalent to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system, as pointed out in Rinco´n-
Zapatero et al. (1998). The former system characterizes MPNE directly, whereas the
latter characterizes the value functions. However, a quasilinear system is much more
amenable than a fully non-linear system of partial differential equations as the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system.
To our knowledge, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions in the literature
to be applied to general differential game models that allow to determine whether the
feedback Nash equilibrium is or not a Pareto optimum. This paper is devoted to
establish a method that allows us to identify the coefficient functions of a rather
general differential game in order that the game possesses an efficient MPNE. A
particular case, for differential games with unidimensional state and control
variables and where each control is a smooth function of the state and time
variable, has been studied in Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (2000). The importance of the
identification of equilibria being Pareto optimum relies on the stability properties of
Nash’s concept and on the efficiency of the cooperative solution. An extreme case of
this type of solutions are the so called absolutely cooperative, which are studied, e.g.,
in Leitmann (1974).
It is well known that, in general, the use of Markov strategies in non-cooperative
games prevents to attain efficient outcomes (see, for example, Dubey, 1986). In fact,
the efficiency of Nash equilibrium can be considered a very rare property. However,
such a property has been noticed to hold for some fishery games Chiarella et al.
(1984). In this paper, the players are restricted to use open-loop strategies, so the
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Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect. Our aim is to analyze whether the same
property can be guaranteed when the players use Markov strategies. Our approach is
based on a necessary condition established in Theorem 2, which constitutes an easily
implementable test for checking if the efficiency of the MPNE is possible in a
concrete differential game. Once we substitute the functional relationship in the
coupled quasilinear system, we obtain an overdetermined system. The existence of
solutions is then tested with a well-known compatibility condition developed in the
theory of partial differential equations, as it is shown in Theorem 3. This is the
content of our sufficiency result.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to state a differential
game in general form and some of its cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. In
particular, MPNE and Pareto optima for the non-cooperative and cooperative
games, respectively. A brief presentation of the new characterization of Nash
equilibrium as solution to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations is also
included. A more detailed analysis of this approach can be found in Rinco´n-Zapatero
et al. (1998) and Martı´n-Herra´n and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2002). In Section 3, Theorem
2, we establish a necessary condition for the Pareto efficiency of MPNE. In Theorem
3, a set of sufficient conditions is given. In order that Nash equilibrium be a Pareto
optimum, our approach uses a compatibility condition that makes the existence of
common solutions of several partial differential equations possible. Let us observe
that the compatibility condition is easier to be applied to a quasilinear partial
differential equations system than to the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system. The
results are shown with three different economic differential games belonging to the
class of dynamic fishery games in Section 4. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. Description of the game: characterization of MPNEIn this section, we present the characteristics of the differential games considered
along the paper, some definitions and the results we will use in the following sections.
First we introduce some notation. A subscript indicates partial differentiation; the
partial derivative of a scalar function with respect to a vector and the partial
derivative of a vector function with respect to a scalar are defined as column vectors.
Also, the partial derivative of a vector function with respect to another vector is
defined as a matrix, e.g. hz ¼ @h=@z ¼ ð@hi=@zjÞnm; where h and z are n  1 and
m  1 vectors, respectively. The superscript > denotes the transposition sign.
We consider an N-person differential game over a fixed and bounded time interval
½0; T : The formulation of the game for the infinite horizon case is quite similar, the
only difference being that there is no bequest function for the players. Please see
below for the definition of the bequest function.
For i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; player i chooses a vector of strategies ui ¼ ðui1; . . . ; uinÞ> 2 Ui to
influence the vector of state variables, y ¼ ðy1; . . . ; ynÞ> 2 Rn; which evolution is
given by the system of ordinary differential equations
_yðsÞ ¼ f ðs; yðsÞ; u1ðsÞ; . . . ; uNðsÞÞ; tpspT ; (1)
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with initial condition
nyðtÞ ¼ x; t 2 ½0; T ; x 2 R ; (2)
and where the pair ðt; xÞ is the root from which the dynamic game proceeds. Since
our aim is to work with the MPNE concept, we need to consider the game for every
root ðt; xÞ: Ui 	 Rn denotes the control region of ith player.
Definition 1 (Admissible strategies). A strategic profile u ¼ ðu1; . . . ; uN Þ is called
admissible if uðsÞ 2 U1  
 
 
  UN for every s 2 ½0; T  and
(i) for every ðt; xÞ the system (1) with initial condition yðtÞ ¼ x admits a unique
solution;(ii) f
s
or each i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; there exists some function fi : ½0; T   Rn!Ui of class C1
uch that uiðsÞ ¼ fiðs; yðsÞÞ for every s 2 ½0; T :
i 1 NLet U denote the set of admissible strategies of player i and U ¼ U  
 
 
 U the
f admissible strategy profiles. Notice that we are considering Markov controls
i
set o
for the players. If f is time independent, the corresponding control is called a
stationary Markov control. Sometimes we will identify ui and fi in the notation.
The instantaneous utility function of player i is denoted by Li and his or her
bequest function by Si: Given ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn and an admissible strategic profile
u; the payoff functional of each player is given by
Jiðt; x; uÞ ¼
Z T
t
e riðs tÞLiðs; yðsÞ; uðsÞÞds þ e riðT tÞSiðT ; yðTÞÞ; (3)
with riX0 the discount rate. The functions
f : ½0; T   Rn  U1  
 
 
  UN!Rn;
Li : ½0; T   Rn  U1  
 
 
  UN!R;
Si : ½0; T   Rn!R;
are all assumed to be of class C1: Jiðt; x; uÞ denotes the utility obtained by player i
when the games starts at ðt; xÞ and the profile of strategies is u.
In the infinite horizon case, which is important for us since the worked examples in
the paper belong to this class of games, the bequest function is of course null. In this
case, if the problem is autonomous and the strategies are Markov stationary, the
value function is independent of time, and the initial condition is simply x, with
t ¼ 0:
In a non-cooperative setting the aim of the players is to maximize their individual
payoff Ji: Since this aspiration depends on the strategies selected by the other players
also, it is generally impossible to attain. An adequate concept of solution is Nash
equilibrium, which prevents unilateral deviations of the players from its recommen-
dation of play.
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Definition 2 (MPNE). An N-tuple of strategies bf 2 U is called a Markov perfect
Nash equilibrium if for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; for every fi 2 UiJiðt; x; ðfijbf iÞÞpJiðt; x; bfÞ;
for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N :
In the definition ðfijbf iÞ denotes ðbf 1; . . . ; bf i 1;fi; bf iþ1; . . . ; bf NÞ: Note that with a
MPNE no player has incentives to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium,
whatever the initial condition ðt; xÞ is.
On the other hand, if the game is cooperative, the players can coordinate their
strategies in order to attain a better total payoff. An N-tuple of strategies is Pareto-
optimal if adopting another strategic profile, either the payoff of each player does
not change or at least the payoff of one player decreases. So that, in both cases there
is no reason for adopting another profile of strategies.
Definition 3 (Pareto optimality). An strategic profile ef ¼ ðef 1; . . . ; ef NÞ> is called
Pareto-optimal for every initial condition ðt; xÞ; if for any other strategic profile
f ¼ ðf1; . . . ;fNÞ>; either
Jiðt; x;fÞ ¼ Jiðt; x; ef Þ
for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N ; or there is at least one i 2 f1; . . . ; Ng such that
Jiðt; x;fÞoJiðt; x; ef Þ:
We define the Hamiltonian function Hiðt; x; u;miÞ ¼ Liðt; x; uÞ þ f >ðt; x; uÞmi; where
mi ¼ ðmi1; . . . ;minÞ> is the vector of costate variables associated to the ith player.
Our aim is to establish useful conditions that allow us to determine the
relationship between the coefficient functions defining the game, if any, assuring
the Pareto-optimality of the MPNE. To this end, we will use the characterization of
MPNE as a solution of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations, as was
proposed in Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (1998) and afterwards extended to the non-
smooth case in Rinco´n-Zapatero (2004). In the former paper the following was
proved, by means of the maximum principle. If bf 2 U is a MPNE of the game,
which is interior to the control region Ui  
 
 
  UN ; then it must satisfy the
following system of partial differential equations:
bHiuit þ bHiuix f þ bHiuiuðbft þ bfx f Þ þ bHiuimi ð bHix  bf>x bHiuÞ ¼ 0;
for i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; ð4Þ
where bHif
g means Hif
g evaluated at ðt; x; bf; liÞ: In (4), f1; . . . ;fN are the dependent
variables – the unknowns – and t; x the independent variables. Since the Nash
equilibrium is interior, the costate vectors that appear in the Hamiltonians associated
with the players are substituted by means of the necessary condition of maximization
of each player’s Hamiltonian:
li ¼ f >ui Liui : (5)
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This way we obtain system (4) of n  N quasilinear partial differential equations
that must be satisfied for a MPNE of class C1:
The boundary condition over the costate variable established by the maximum
principle and the expression obtained from the maximization of the Hamiltonian
function provide a complete set of final conditions for the system (4) given by
Liui ðT ; x; bfÞ þ f >ui ðT ; x; bfÞSixðT ; xÞ ¼ 0: (6)
In Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (1998) we show that under suitable hypotheses about
the Hamiltonian functions a C1 solution of (4), (6) becomes a MPNE of the
differential game. That is, this system not only gives a set of necessary conditions but
also sufficient for optimality. The sufficiency result can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 1. Let bf 2 U be a global C1 solution of (4), (6) interior to the control region
and satisfying det j f ui ðt; x; bfÞja0 for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N:
Suppose further that for every ðt; xÞ and for all fi 2 Ui
Hiðt; x; ðfijbf iÞ;Giðt; x; bf iÞÞpHiðt; x; bf;Giðt; x; bf iÞÞ; (7)
for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N: Then Vixðt; xÞ ¼ Giðt; x; bfðt; xÞÞ and bf is a MPNE of the game
(1)–(3).
In the statement of the theorem, Giðt; x; uÞ ¼ ð f >ui Liui Þðt; x; uÞ and Vi denotes the
value function of the ith player
Viðt; xÞ ¼ max
fi2Ui
fJiðt; x; ðfijbf iÞÞ : _y ¼ f ðs; y; ðfijbf iÞÞ; yðtÞ ¼ x; 8s 2 ðt; TÞg:
Remark 1. Theorem 1 states that the costate variables of the players coincide with
the gradient of the value function with respect to x, liðtÞ ¼ Vixðt; xÞ:
Remark 2. In the infinite horizon case, suppose that Jiðt; x; uÞ converges uniformly
for all admissible profile u 2 U: Let bf be a solution to (4) satisfying
lim
T!1
GiðT ; yðTÞ; bfðT ; yðTÞÞÞ @y
@x
ðTÞ ¼ 0; (8)
for every i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; where ð@y=@xÞðTÞ denotes the derivative with respect to x of
the solution to (1)–(2) associated with bf: Consider the solution z of (1)–(2) associated
to the strategic profile ðfijbf iÞ; for an arbitrary fi 2 Ui: Suppose further that
lim sup
T!1
V ðT ; zðTÞÞX0: (9)
Then it can be proved that bf is a MPNE of the infinite horizon game.
3. Necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency of MPNEIn this section, we center our attention on the statement of necessary and sufficient
conditions for Pareto efficiency of MPNE. The Nash equilibrium concept presents
an important feature related to stability: no player can achieve a better result by
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deviating unilaterally from his or her Nash controls as long as the other players
continue to use their Nash strategies. However, this solution can give inefficient
outcomes. On the other hand, the players do not have incentives to play Pareto
optima if they are not able to attain binding agreements.
The next result establishes that in order for a MPNE to be Pareto optimum it is
necessary that no prisoners’ dilemma occurs in the static game with payoff functions
ðH1; . . . ; HN Þ; for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn: However, this is only a necessary condition.
The Pareto optimality of Nash strategies in the static Hamiltonian game does not
prevent the non-efficiency of Nash equilibria. This was already noted in Starr and
Ho (1969).
Theorem 2. Let bf 2 U be a C1 MPNE of the game (1) (3), interior to the control
region and satisfying det j f ui ðt; x; f^Þja0 for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; i 2 f1; . . . ; Ng: Let
Hi be of class C2 with respect to u 2 U for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N : Assume
that the following set of conditions hold:
signðHiu j ðt; x; bf;GiÞÞ ¼ signðHku j ðt; x; bf;GkÞÞ; (10)
for all i; j; k 2 f1; . . . ; Ng with i; kaj: If bf is Pareto optimum, then for all ðt; xÞ 2
½0; T   Rn there exists i 2 f1; . . . ; Ng such that for all j 2 f1; . . . ; Ng; jai
ð f >u j Liu j  f >ui Liui Þðt; x; bfÞ ¼ 0: (11)
Proof. For i fixed let us suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist j 2
f1; . . . ; Ng; iaj; t 2 ½0; T  and x 2 Rn such that
ð f >u j Liu j  f >ui Liui Þðt; x; bfÞa0: (12)
Since Hi is C2; for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn we have for all u 2 U
Hiðt; x; u;GiÞ ¼ Hiðt; x; bf;GiÞ þXN
k 1
ðuk  bf kÞHiuk ðt; x; bf;GiÞ
þ 1
2
XN
k 1
XN
l 1
ðuk  bf kÞHiukul ðt; x; ui;GiÞðul  bf lÞ>; ð13Þ
with ui in the segment ½bfðt; xÞ; uðt; xÞ: Furthermore, due to the subgame perfectness
property of bf and the fact that it is interior to Ui we have
Hiui ðt; x; bf;GiÞ ¼ 0; for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn:
Then, for iaj
Hiu j ðt; x; bf;GiÞ ¼ ðLiu j  f >u j f >ui Liui Þðt; x; bfÞ ¼ ð f >u j ð f >u j Liu j  f >ui Liui ÞÞðt; x; bfÞ;
for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn: As a consequence of hypothesis (12), Hiu j ðt¯; x¯; bf;GiÞa0
and obviously, this inequality holds in a neighborhood O of ðt; xÞ:
For e 2 Rn with all components positive and sufficiently small, let us consider
fk ¼ bf k þ eS; for all k 2 f1; . . . ; Ng; where S denotes a n  n diagonal matrix,
7
having each diagonal element equal to 1 if the corresponding component of
Hiu j ðt; x; bf;GiÞ is positive and equal to 1 if it is negative. Then fk 2 Uk and the
quadratic terms in the Taylor expansion are negligible with respect to the other
terms. With this choice and taking into account (10) we have, for f ¼ ðf1; . . . ;fN Þ
Hiðt; x;f;GiÞXHiðt; x; bf;GiÞ for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; (14)
with strict inequality in O; as can be seen from (13). It has to be proved that
Jiðt; x;fÞ4Jiðt; x; bfÞ and Jkðt; x;fÞXJkðt; x; bfÞ for kai; in order to contradict thatbf is a Pareto optimum. To this end, let y be the solution of the differential equation
_yðsÞ ¼ f ðs; yðsÞ;f1ðs; yðsÞÞ; . . . ;fNðs; yðsÞÞÞ; yðtÞ ¼ x; s 2 ½t; T :
Denoting uðsÞ ¼ fðs; yðsÞÞ and buðsÞ ¼ bfðs; yðsÞÞ; substituting t ¼ s; x ¼ yðsÞ and
adding Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ  riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ to both sides of inequality (14) we have
Hiðs; yðsÞ; uðsÞ;Giðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞÞ þ Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ  riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ
XHiðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞ;Giðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞÞ þ Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ  riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ ð15Þ
for all sXt; with strict inequality for all s such that ðs; yðsÞÞ 2 O: If we derive the
expression with respect to s
Jiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ ¼ Z T
s
e riðt sÞLiðt; yðtÞ; buðtÞÞdtþ e riðT sÞSiðT ; yðTÞÞ;
we obtain
Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ þ Jixðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ f ðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞ ¼ Liðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞ þ riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ:
(16)
Taking into account Theorem 1, Giðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞ ¼ Vixðs; yðsÞÞ ¼ Jixðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ; hence
rearranging terms from (16) we get
Hiðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞ;Giðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞÞ þ Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ  riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ ¼ 0
and, in consequence, (15) implies
Hiðs; yðsÞ; uðsÞ;Giðs; yðsÞ; buðsÞÞÞ þ Jitðs; yðsÞ; bfÞ  riJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞX0;
with strict inequality for s such that ðs; yðsÞÞ 2 O: Rearranging terms again and
multiplying by e riðs tÞ; we obtain
d
ds
ðe riðs tÞJiðs; yðsÞ; bfÞÞ þ e riðs tÞLiðs; yðsÞ; uðsÞÞX0:
Integrating the above inequality in ½t; T  we have
e riðT tÞSiðT ; yðTÞÞ  Jiðt; x; bfÞ þ Z T
t
e riðs tÞLiðs; yðsÞ; uðsÞÞdsX0;
that is Jiðt; x;fÞ4Jiðt; x; bfÞ and analogously for all kai; Jkðt; x;fÞXJkðt; x; bfÞ; due
to the selection made on uk in the Taylor expansion of each Hk: Consequently, the
Nash equilibrium cannot be Pareto optimum. &
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Remark 3. The main ingredients in the previous theorem are the existence of an
interior and C1 MPNE and the identity Giðt; x; bfðt; xÞÞ ¼ Vixðt; xÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N;
which was rigorously proved in Rinco´n-Zapatero et al. (1998). The proof also works
if the dimension of the state variable and the control variables are different but the
two conditions just remarked hold.
Remark 4. The concavity of Hamiltonian Hi with respect to variables ðu1; . . . ; uN Þ
implies that the necessary condition (11) for the ith player is also sufficient for Pareto
efficiency of Nash equilibrium. This can be seen from the Taylor expansion (13),
where the second order term is negative. In this case the MPNE is in fact the optimal
profile that the ith player would choose in case he or she could manage all the control
variables. Hence, the efficient MPNE would arise as the optimal control profile when
the ith player has all the bargaining power in the cooperative game. If condition (11)
is satisfied for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; N together with the supplementary hypothesis of
concave Hamiltonians Hi; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; with respect to all the control variables, for
all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn; then the MPNE is an absolutely cooperative solution. Let us
note that condition (11) is fulfilled for zero-sum games and team problems.
Remark 5. The necessary condition (11) established in Theorem 2 for N-person
games with unidimensional state and control variables can be written
ðLiu j f ui  Liui f u j Þðt; x; bfÞ ¼ 0; for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn:
Remark 6. The hypothesis (10) can be eliminated in the statement of Theorem 2
when a two-person game is considered. The two-person game with a unique state
variable and one control variable for each player was studied in Rinco´n-Zapatero
et al. (2000).
Our purpose now is to establish sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency of a
MPNE. From now on, we concentrate on the two-person game with a unique state
variable and one control variable for each player, but the following could be
extended to a more general setting. We denote by u2 ¼ jðt; x; u1Þ the necessary
relation (11) between the strategies of the two players. By replacing this relation in
system (4) that holds for a MPNE, we obtain an overdetermined system. We look for
conditions ensuring the existence of solutions to this system. To this end, we
introduce the following notation for the two partial differential equations that arise
from (4) once we have substituted u2 ¼ jðt; x; u1Þ
Fiðt; x; u1; p; qÞ ¼ aiðt; x; u1Þp þ biðt; x; u1Þq þ ciðt; x; u1Þ; i ¼ 1; 2:
Here p ¼ u1t ; q ¼ u1x and
ai ¼ Hiuiui þ Hiuiu jju;
bi ¼ Hiuiui f þ Hiuiu jjuf  f ui Hiu jju;
ci ¼ Hiuit þ Hiuix f þ Hiuiu j ðjt þ jx f Þ  f ui ðHix þ Hiu jjxÞ:
All functions are evaluated at ðt; x; u1;jðt; x; u1ÞÞ and li ¼ f 1ui Liui :
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Assuming that D ¼ a1
a2
b1
b2
 a0 for all t; x; u1; then    1 
p
q
¼ a1 b1
a2 b2
c1
c2
: (17)
We denote by ½F 1; F 2 the following sum of determinants
½F 1; F2 ¼
F 1x F
1
q
F 2x F
2
q

þ p F
1
u1 F
1
p
F 2u1 F
2
p

þ F
1
t F
1
p
F 2t F
2
p

þ q F
1
u1 F
1
q
F2u1 F
2
q

;
once we have replaced p; q by their expressions given by (17).
Theorem 3. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied:
(C1) The pair ðbf 1;jÞ 2 U is a C1 Markov Pareto optimum of problem (1)–(3), such
that f u1ðt; x; bf 1;jÞa0 for all ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   Rn:(C2) ½
(C3) TThen
ProofF1; F 2 ¼ 0:
he pair ðbf 1;jÞ satisfies the final condition required in (6) associated to problem
(1)–(3).
(C4) For all u1 2 U1; u2 2 U2; t 2 ½0; T ; for every ðt; xÞ 2 ½0; T   RnH1ðt; x; bf 1;j;G1ÞXH1ðt; x; bf 1; u2;G1Þ;
H2ðt; x; bf 1;j;G2ÞXH2ðt; x; u1;j;G2Þ;
where Gi equals f 1ui Liui evaluated at ðt; x; bf 1;jÞ; i ¼ 1; 2:
ðbf 1;jÞ is a MPNE.
. When Da0; expression ½F 1; F2 ¼ 0 is a compatibility condition that ensuresthe existence of some common solution to the two partial differential equations,
Ames (1965):
F1ðt; x; u; ut; uxÞ ¼ 0
F2ðt; x; u; ut; uxÞ ¼ 0:
Since Fi ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2 characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game and taking into
account conditions (C3), and (C4), we can apply Theorem 1 and conclude that the
pair ðbf;jÞ is a MPNE. &
Remark 7. As we did in Remark 2, when an infinite horizon is considered, the final
condition (C3) in Theorem 3 must be replaced by the sufficient transversality
conditions (8) and (9).
Remark 8. When Da0 and the compatibility condition stated in Theorem 3 is not
fulfilled, then the Pareto optimum cannot be a Nash equilibrium. In fact, ½F 1; F2 ¼ 0
is a necessary condition for the efficiency of Nash equilibrium. This provides a
negative criterion based on a full computational method. When D ¼ 0 and the
equations F1  0; F2  0 are not such that one implies the other, then there is no
common solution to the equations, hence again in this case the MPNE is not
efficient.
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4. Application to dynamic fishery gamesIn this section the necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of a MPNE
established in Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3 are applied to dynamic fishery games.
First a very general model of fishing borrowed from Chiarella et al. (1984) is stated.
Let us consider N countries that can access to m fish populations. The instantaneous
utility of the ith country is
Liðc1; . . . ; cN ; x1; . . . ; xmÞ;
where xj is the jth fish population and c
i  ðci1; . . . ; cimÞ is the extraction vector of the
ith country, with cij the extraction rate by the ith country for the jth fish population.
The population dynamics are described by the differential equations
_xj ¼ Gjðc1; . . . ; cN ; x1; . . . ; xmÞ; j ¼ 1; . . . ; m:
This specification includes predator–prey and other types of biological interaction.
The payoff functional of each player is given as in (3).
In Chiarella et al. (1984) four sets of conditions, under each of which there is an
efficient Nash equilibrium path, are stated for some particular specifications of the
fishery model described above. The solution concept used is open-loop. Although the
efficiency of open-loop Nash equilibria for a class of fishery models is shown, by means
of the necessary condition derived in Theorem 2 it can be proved that the Pareto
optimal solution cannot be achieved as a MPNE. A similar result for a simple model of
exploitation of a common-property non-renewable resource is stated in Dockner et al.
(2000). The authors show that the achievement of the cooperative solution as a Nash
equilibrium depends on what set of strategies is available to the players.
Let us consider that Li is a function of ci only. In Chiarella et al. (1984) it is
proved that for this choice and independently of the population dynamics, there
exists a Pareto-optimal open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Assume that Li is a function of ci only, that for some component cij
there is no satiation point of Li and that
G jðc1; . . . ; cN ; x1; . . . ; xmÞ ¼ eG jðx1; . . . ; xmÞ XN
k 1
ckj :
Then the MPNE is not Pareto optimal.
Proof. Applying the necessary condition (11) for the specification given and for the
ith player we have
Licij ¼ 0; for all j 2 f1; . . . ; Ng;
which is impossible for at least one j. &
The condition Licij ¼ 0 means that the player maximizes instantaneously the utility
function, without taking into account the dynamics of the species population. For
that reason, this condition does not have sense for most of the utility functions used
in the economic models, when a myopic behavior of the agents is ruled out.
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From now on we center on two different statements of a two species fishery
differential game and we try to identify the coefficient functions of the games such
that these admit efficient MPNE. The first example is taken from Clemhout and Wan
(1985) who studied an infinite horizon differential game in the setting of a
prey–predator system. The second example is borrowed from Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al.
(1985). These authors analyze a finite horizon differential game in the framework of
fishery management and in particular of the exploitation of the so-called
transboundary fisheries.
Example 1. We consider the following two-person two-species differential game
where players harvest from two different fish populations. Let us assume the
following system dynamics:
_x1 ¼ x1ð1 b11 log x1  b12 log x2Þ  c11  c21; x1ð0Þ ¼ x10; ð18Þ
_x2 ¼ x2ð1 b21 log x1  b22 log x2Þ  c12  c22; x2ð0Þ ¼ x20; ð19Þ
where x1 and x2 denote the stocks of the two species and c
ij denotes the harvest rate
of player i on species j: The payoff for the ith player is given by
W iðx0; cÞ ¼
Z 1
0
e ri tgiðx; cÞdt;
where ri is the discount rate and
giðx; cÞ ¼
X2
j 1
wij log xj þ
X2
l 1
wcilj log c
lj
" #
;
wijX0; wciljX0; w
c
iij40; for all i; j; l ¼ 1; 2:
We have eliminated the time dependencies to shorten the notation. The differential
game can be formulated as
max
ci1;ci2
fW iðx0; cÞ : s:t: ð18Þ ð19Þg;
for i ¼ 1; 2:
In order to analyze the Pareto efficiency of MPNE we first focus our attention in
the simplest specification: the two-person one-species differential game. The
population dynamics for this game is
_x ¼ xð1 b log xÞ  c1  c2; xð0Þ ¼ x0;
where x denotes the stock of the fish species and ci denotes the harvest rate of player
i: The function giðx; cÞ for the ith player is
giðx; cÞ ¼ wi log x þ
X2
j 1
wcij log c
j ;
wiX0; wcijX0; w
c
ii40; for all i; j ¼ 1; 2:
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The necessary condition (11) for the first player implies
cc2 ¼ w12
wc11
c1; (20)
establishing that the harvest rates of the players are proportional. Hence we must
limit our search for efficient MPNE to strategic profiles fulfilling (20). System (4)
satisfying the relationship between the strategies of the two players reads
 c1t x þ c1xx c1
ðwc11 þ wc12Þ
wc11
 xð1 b log xÞ

 
¼ c1 c1 w1
wc11
þ xð1 b log x  b  r1Þ

 
; ð21Þ
 c1t x þ c1xx c1
wc12
wc11w
c
22
ðwc21 þ wc22Þ  xð1 b log xÞ

 
¼ c1 c1 w
c
12
wc11w
c
22
w2 þ xð1 b log x  b  r2Þ

 
: ð22Þ
Since we have stated an infinite horizon game and the problem is autonomous,
stationary strategies are considered. In order to test if there is some solution to
system (21)–(22) we make use of the compatibility condition (C2). For this game, it
appears as a third degree homogeneous polynomial in the variables x; c1; namely,
a1ðc1Þ3 þ a2ðc1Þ2x þ a3c1x2:
There are only two possible sets of conditions on the parameters under which the
polynomial is identically null, and then the compatibility condition ensures the
existence of at least one common solution to system (21)–(22).
 One-species game, I.
r1 ¼ r2 ¼ r; wc12 ¼
w1
wc22; w
c
21 ¼
w2
wc11; w140; w240: (23)w w2 1
Under these conditions equations (21)–(22) are proportional, then it is sufficient
to find a solution for, for example, the first one. It could be proved that the linear
solution given by
c1 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
11w2
wc11w2 þ ðwc22 þ w2Þw1
x;
satisfies Eq. (21), and therefore, Eq. (22). From condition (20) the corresponding
harvest rate of the second player is
c2 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
22w1
wc11w2 þ ðwc22 þ w2Þw1
x:
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 One-species game, II.
c c
d
t
H
v
c
ð
s
n
T
E
U
Ur1 ¼ r2 ¼ r; wc12 ¼
ðw1 þ w11Þw22
w2 þ wc21
; w2 þ wc2140: (24)
In this case these equations are not proportional and we have to look for
solutions satisfying both equations simultaneously. It is easy to prove that the
following linear solution satisfies system (21)–(22)
c1 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
11ðw2 þ wc21Þ
ðwc11 þ w1Þðwc22 þ w2 þ wc21Þ
x:
As before, from condition (20) the corresponding harvest rate of the second
player is
c2 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
12ðw2 þ wc21Þ
ðwc11 þ w1Þðwc22 þ w2 þ wc21Þ
x:
In both cases, it is straightforward to show that the established strategy makes the
ynamics stable if b40:
The concavity of Hi with respect to his or her own control variable is ensured and
his property assures the fulfillment of condition (C4) in Theorem 3. Moreover, the
amiltonians H1 and H2 are strictly concave with respect to all the control
ariables, which makes applicable Remark 4 guaranteeing that the necessary
ondition (11) is sufficient too and assuring the Pareto optimality of the pair
c1; ðwc12=wc11Þc1Þ: Consequently, all the conditions listed in Theorem 3 are fulfilled.
Once we have characterized the efficient MPNE for the one-species game,
ummarized in Table 1, we return to the original two-species specification. The
ecessary condition (11) for the ith player for this specification reads
c2j ¼ w
c
i2j
wci1j
c1j ; j ¼ 1; 2; (25)
able 1xample 1. One species game
Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
nder (23):
c1 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
11w2
wc11w2 þ ðwc22 þ w2Þw1
x; c2 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
22w1
wc11w2 þ ðwc22 þ w2Þw1
x
nder (24):
c1 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
11ðw2 þ wc21Þ
ðwc11 þ w1Þðwc22 þ w2 þ wc21Þ
x; c2 ¼ ðb þ rÞw
c
12ðw2 þ wc21Þ
ðwc11 þ w1Þðwc22 þ w2 þ wc21Þ
x
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where wcilj for all i; j; l ¼ 1; 2 are assumed to be strictly positive. Let us note that the
necessary condition establishes, as in the one-species specification, that the harvest
rate of one player on species j; for j ¼ 1; 2; is proportional to that of the other player.
Focusing our attention on the symmetric game, the following additional
hypotheses over the parameters are considered:
w1i ¼ w2i for i ¼ 1; 2; wc1ij ¼ wc2ij for i; j ¼ 1; 2; r1 ¼ r2:
Let us note that under the symmetric hypothesis when the necessary condition for
one player is satisfied it is also for the other player. As usual for symmetric games we
look for symmetric solutions, i.e., the optimal harvest rates must satisfy c1i ¼
c2i for i ¼ 1; 2: Hence, if the set of optimal control is restricted to those symmetric, in
the relationship between the optimal harvest rates of both players established in (25),
necessary for a MPNE being a Pareto optimum, the following conditions have to be
imposed:
wc12i ¼ wc11i for i ¼ 1; 2:
Then, for the symmetric game the notation can be simplified as follows:
wji ¼ wi for i; j ¼ 1; 2; wcijl ¼ wcl for i; j; l ¼ 1; 2; r1 ¼ r2 ¼ r:
By replacing the relationships between the harvest rate of both players given by
(25) in system (4), and substituting the costate vectors by
li ¼ e ri tðwc1=ci1; wc2=ci2Þ>; i ¼ 1; 2;
where the necessary condition of maximization of each player’s Hamiltonian (5) has
been used, we obtain the following system of quasilinear partial differential
equations:
c11t þ Aðx1; x2; c11Þc11x1 þ Bðx1; x2; c12Þc11x2 ¼ Cðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ; ð26Þ
c12t þ Aðx1; x2; c11Þc12x1 þ Bðx1; x2; c12Þc12x2 ¼ Dðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ; ð27Þ
where
Aðx1; x2; c11Þ ¼ x1ð1 b11 log x1  b12 log x2Þ  2c11;
Bðx1; x2; c12Þ ¼ x2ð1 b21 log x1  b22 log x2Þ  2c12;
Cðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ
¼ c11 rþ c
11w1
x1w
c
1
þ 1 b11  b11 log x1  b12 log x2  c
11wc2x2b21
c12wc1x1

 
;
Dðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ
¼ c12 rþ c
12w2
x2w
c
2
þ 1 b22  b21 log x1  b22 log x2 
c12wc1x1b12
c11wc2x2

 
:
Since the problem is settled with an infinite time horizon stationary feedback
equilibria are searched and then the time derivatives in system (26)–(27) are null.
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As the simplest case to find a solution of the system (26)–(27) we look for solutions
in the class of linear solutions. That is, we want to find constants A1; B1; A2; B2
such that
c11 ¼ A1x1 þ B1x2; c12 ¼ A2x1 þ B2x2;
satisfy system (26)–(27).
After tedious computations the solutions summarized in Table 2 can be
characterized as shown below.
 Two-species game, I. B1 ¼ 0; A2 ¼ 0:
In this case c11 ¼ A1x1; c12 ¼ B2x2; is an efficient subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium when constants A1 and B2 are given by
A1 ¼
Uwc1
U21
; B2 ¼
Uwc2
U12
;
where
U ¼ b12b21  ðb11 þ rÞðb22 þ rÞ;
Uij ¼ bijðwi þ 2wci Þ  ðbii þ rÞðwj þ 2wcj Þ; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj:
For the extraction rate being positive A1 and B2 have to be positive constants.
This is guaranteed if all parameters U;Uij ; i; j ¼ 1; 2 are either positive or negative.
Furthermore, if the hypothesis b21 ¼ 0 is added, i.e., the evolution of the stock of
the second species is independent of the stock of the first one, we obtain the
following one-parametric family of efficient solutions:
c11 ¼ A1x1; c12 ¼
A1ðb22 þ rÞwc2
A1ðw2 þ 2wc2Þ  b12wc1
x2:
Both harvest rates are positive if the following conditions are satisfied:
A140; A14
b12w
c
1
w2 þ 2wc2
: (28)
It can be proved that for this kind of solutions the equilibrium state trajectory
presents different types of stability. First, it converges globally to a unique steady
state if b11b22  b12b2140 and b11 þ b2240: Second, if b11b22  b12b2140 and
b11 þ b22 ¼ 0 the equilibrium trajectory follows a closed curve, i.e., the steady state
behaves as a center. Third, if b11b22  b12b21o0 the steady state is a saddle point,
guaranteeing that the equilibrium state trajectory converges asymptotically to the
steady state. These results are in concordance with those established in Clemhout
and Wan (1985) in the framework of a predator–prey system.
Two-species game, II. B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b21; b12 ¼ b22:
Under these hypotheses several cases appear, each of them leading to a one-
parametric family of efficient MPNE.16
1. A1 ¼ b22w
c
1
w2
; B2 ¼ b11w
c
2
w1
; w1a0; w2a0:
(a) Choosing
c c
Table 2
Example 1. Two species symmetric game
Conditions Symmetric Markov perfect Nash equilibria: c1i ¼ c2i; i ¼ 1; 2
Linear Strategies: c11 ¼ A1x1 þ B1x2; c12 ¼ A2x1 þ B2x2
8i; j ¼ 1; 2
B1 ¼ 0; A2 ¼ 0; A1 ¼
Uwc1
U21
; B2 ¼
Uwc2
U12
:
U; Uij40
or
U; Uijo0
Under (28)
B1 ¼ 0; A2 ¼ 0; b21 ¼ 0; B2 ¼
A1ðb22 þ rÞwc2
A1ðw2 þ 2wc2Þ b12wc1
for all A140:
Under (Aa)
B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b2140; b12 ¼ b2240; A1 ¼
b22w
c
1
w2
; B2 ¼
b11w
c
2
w1
;
or (Ba) and
w1a0; w2a0; A2 ¼
b11w
c
1L1w
c
2
B1w
2
1ðw1 þ 2wc1Þ
for all B140:
L140
Under (Ab)
B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b2140; b12 ¼ b2240; A1 ¼
b22w
c
1
w2
; B2 ¼
b11w
c
2
w1
;
or (Bb) and
w1a0; w2a0; A2 ¼
b11w
c
1D1w
c
2
B1w
4
1
for all B140:
D140
Under(29)
B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b2140; b12 ¼ b22; A1 ¼ X
2w1
; B2 ¼ b11w
c
2
w1
;
and X40
w1a0; B1 ¼
b11w
c
2X
2A2w
2
1
for all A240:
Under (30)
B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b21 ¼ 0; b12 ¼ b2240; A1 ¼
Y
2w22
; B2 ¼
2b22w
c
1w
c
2
w22
;
and Y40
w1 ¼ 0; w2a0; B1 ¼
b22w
c
1w
c
2Y
A2w
4
2
for all A240:
B1a0; A2a0; b11 ¼ b21 ¼ 0; b12 ¼ b22; w1 ¼ 0; A1 ¼ r 2B2
2
;
B1 ¼
B2ðr 2B2Þ
2A2
for all A240 and 0oB2or=2:
b12 ¼ b22 ¼ 0; A2 ¼ A1 ¼ 0; B2 ¼ r=2; for all B140:A2 ¼
b11w1L1w2
B1w
2
1ðw1 þ 2wc1Þ
; for all B140;
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where
L ¼ ðrþ b Þw  2b wc; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj;i ii i ii j
generates a family of efficient Nash Equilibria, if one (or both) of the
following conditions on the parameters is satisfied:
(Aa) Liwj  bjjwiðwi þ 2wci Þ ¼ 0; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj;
b22 ¼ 1:
(Ba)
4b22w
c
1ðw2 þ wc2Þ  ðb22 þ rÞw22 ¼ 0;
b11w
2
2  2b22w1wc1 ¼ 0;
L1w2  2b22w1ðw1 þ 2wc1Þ ¼ 0:
(b) Choosing
A2 ¼ b11w
c
1w
c
2D1
B1w
4
1
; for all B140;
where
Di ¼ ðrþ biiÞw2i  2biiðwi þ 2wci Þwcj ; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj;
generates a family of efficient Nash equilibria if one (or both) of the
following conditions on the parameters is satisfied:
(Ab) L2w1  b11w2ðw2 þ 2wc2Þ ¼ 0;
b22w
2
1  2b11w2wc2 ¼ 0;
w2D1  b22w31 ¼ 0:
(Bb)
biiw
2
j  2bjjwiwci ¼ 0; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj;
w1b11w
c
2D2  w2b22wc1D1 ¼ 0:
To guarantee positive values of constants A1; B2 and A2 is sufficient to choose
b2240; b1140 and L140 or D140; for the first and second case, respectively.
2. A1 ¼ X2w1 ; B2 ¼
b11w
c
2
w1
; w1a0; where X ¼ rw1  2b11wc2:
Choosing
B1 ¼
b11w
c
2X
2A2w
2
1
; for all A240;
generates a family of efficient Nash equilibria, if the following condition on the
parameters is satisfied:
2b11ðwc1 þ wc2Þ  rw1 ¼ 0: (29)
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Positive values of constants A1; B2 and B1 are guaranteed when b1140 and
X40:
3. w1 ¼ 0; b11 ¼ b21 ¼ 0:
(a) A1 ¼ Y2w2
2
; B2 ¼ 2b22w
c
1
wc
2
w2
2
; w2a0; where Y ¼ rw22  4b22wc1wc2:
Choosing
B1 ¼
b22w
c
1w
c
2Y
A2w
4
2
; for all A240;
generates a family of efficient Nash equilibria, if the following condition is
satisfied:
w2  2wc1 ¼ 0: (30)
The fulfillment of inequalities b2240 and rw22  4b22wc1wc240 implies
positive values of constants A1; B2 and B1:
(b) A1 ¼ r 2B22 ; B1 ¼ B2ðr 2B2Þ2A2 ; A2a0:
For all A240 and 0oB2or=2 we have constants A1 and B1 taking positive
values and leading to a family of efficient MPNE.
Under the hypothesis b11 ¼ b21; b12 ¼ b22 being B1a0; A2a0; it can be proved
that the equilibrium state trajectory converges asymptotically to the steady state if
and only if b11 þ b2240: In this case, the stability analysis shows that nor global
stability of the equilibrium trajectory neither a closed curve around the steady state
can appear.
Two-species game, III. b12 ¼ b22 ¼ 0:
Choosing A2 ¼ A1 ¼ 0; B2 ¼ r=2 and any positive value for B1; we obtain a
MPNE being Pareto optimum.The concavity of Hi with respect to his or her own control variables is ensured. As
we pointed out in Remark 4, this assures that the necessary condition (11) for the ith
player is sufficient too. Moreover, the Hamiltonians H1 and H2 are strictly concave
with respect to all the control variables and knowing that the symmetric game
condition (11) is satisfied for both players, then all the MPNE we have characterized
for this example correspond to absolute cooperative solutions.
Example 2. Following Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al. (1985) the following two-person two-
species differential game is considered:
max
cij
Z T
0
e ri t
X2
j 1
ðpjcij  Cijðcij ; xjÞÞ
" #
dt;
s:t: _xj ¼ F jðxjÞ  sðxj  xkÞ  c1j  c2j ;
i; j ¼ 1; 2; k ¼ 1; 2; kaj:
This model corresponds to a game of exploitation of the so-called transboundary
fisheries. As in the previous example state variables x1 and x2 represent the stock of
the first and second species, and cij denotes the harvest rate of each country i with
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respect to species j: The model can be interpreted as one of the two fisheries with the
same kind of fish in two different locations. Function sðxj  xkÞ corresponds to a
diffusion factor that represents the natural transfer of fish from one location to the
other. pj is the price of fish at fishery j; Cijð
; 
Þ is the cost function for using the
harvest rate cij at stock level xj : Finally, ri is the discount rate used by country i:
In what follows, the cost functions are assumed to be quadratic
Cijðcij ; xjÞ ¼
1
2
ðaijðcijÞ2 þ bijx2j þ 2gijxjcijÞ; i; j ¼ 1; 2;
with aij40; bij40; gijo0: We will illustrate our results for different specifications of
the renovation functions, F jðxjÞ:
The necessary condition (11) for a MPNE being a Pareto optimum for the second
player reads:
c2i ¼ pi  g2ixi
a2i
; i ¼ 1; 2: (31)
Since gijo0 for all i; j ¼ 1; 2; the extraction rates for the second player always take
positive values. It is worth noting that for this example the necessary condition for
the efficiency of the MPNE does not establish a relationship between the control
variables of the two players, as in the previous example. On the contrary, (31)
directly gives the functional expressions for the two control variables for the second
player.
By replacing the expressions given by (31) in the equations of system (4)
corresponding to the second player, and substituting the costate vectors by
li ¼ e ri tðp1  ai1ci1  gi1x1; p2  ai2ci2  gi2x2Þ>; i ¼ 1; 2;
where the necessary condition of maximization of each player’s Hamiltonian (5) has
been used, the following pair of equations is obtained:
3g2i F iðxiÞ  sðxi  xjÞ  c1i 
pi  g2ixi
a2i

 
 b2ixi  g2i
pi  g2ixi
a2i
 
¼ 0;
for i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj: From these equations one can obtain the expressions for the
control variables of the first player:
c1i ¼ F iðxiÞ  s
4
3
g2i
a2i
þ 1
3
b2i
g2i
 
xi þ sxj 
4
3
pi
a2i
; i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj; (32)
where g21 and g22 are assumed to be not null, since g21 ¼ g22 ¼ 0 implies b21 ¼
b22 ¼ 0; which contradicts the hypothesis bij40; for all i; j ¼ 1; 2: To guarantee that
the harvest rates of the first player are positive, conditions on the parameters of the
model which depend on the renovation functions, Fið
Þ; i ¼ 1; 2 have to be imposed.
Our aim now is to prove when the harvest rates for the first player, given
by (32), correspond to a solution to the pair of quasilinear partial differential
equations of system (4) associated to the first player, where as before the
harvest rates of the second player given by (31) and the costate vectors have been
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replaced
11 11 11 12 11 11 12ct þ Aðx1; x2; c Þcx1 þ Bðx1; x2; c Þcx2 ¼ Cðx1; x2; c ; c Þ; ð33Þ
c12t þ Aðx1; x2; c11Þc12x1 þ Dðx1; x2; c12Þc12x2 ¼ Eðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ; ð34Þ
where
Aðx1; x2; c11Þ ¼ F1ðx1Þ  sðx1  x2Þ  c11 
p1  g21x1
a21
;
Bðx1; x2; c12Þ ¼ ða11Þ 1 F2ðx2Þ  sðx2  x1Þ  c12  p2  g22x2a22

 
;
Cðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ ¼ ða11Þ 1 ðp1  a11c11  g11x1Þ r1 þ F 01ðx1Þ  sþ
g21
a21
 

þ ðp2  a12c12  g12x2Þs b11x1  g11c11
þg11 F 1ðx1Þ  sðx1  x2Þ  c11 
p1  g21x1
a21
 
;
Dðx1; x2; c12Þ ¼ ða12Þ 1 F2ðx2Þ  sðx2  x1Þ  c12  p2  g22x2a22

 
;
Eðx1; x2; c11; c12Þ ¼ ða12Þ 1 ðp2  a12c12  g12x2Þ r1 þ F 02ðx2Þ  sþ
g22
a22
 

þ ðp1  a11c11  g11x1Þs b12x2  g12c12
þg12 F 2ðx2Þ  sðx2  x1Þ  c12 
p2  g22x2
a22
 
:
Assuming an infinite horizon game, we search for stationary feedback equilibria.
Then the time dependency in system (33)–(34) can be eliminated. Replacing the
harvest rates for the first player given by (32) in (33) and (34), we get the following
pair of equations that have to be satisfied for an efficient MPNE:
½pi  a1iðF iðxiÞ  sðxi  xjÞÞ  g1ixi r1 þ F 0iðxiÞ  sþ
g2i
a2i

 
 ½b1ixi þ g1iðF iðxiÞ  sðxi  xjÞÞ
þ ½pj  a1jðFjðxjÞ  sðxj  xiÞÞ  g1jxjs
þ pi  g2ixi
3a2i
a1i 4r1  3sþ 3F 0iðxiÞ þ
8g2i
3a2i
þ b2i
3g2i
 
þ 5g1i

 
þ b2i
3g2i
xi 2g1iþa1i r1 
g2i
3a2i
þ b2i
3g2i
 
 
þ b2j
3g2j
xjða1j  a1iÞsþ
pj  g2jxj
3a2j
ð4a1j  a1iÞs ¼ 0;
i; j ¼ 1; 2; iaj:
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We search for conditions over the parameters that guarantee the fulfillment of the
above equations. First, we assume that the renovation functions are described by
logistic functions, i.e., FiðxiÞ ¼ rixið1 xi=KiÞ; i ¼ 1; 2; where ri and Ki are the
intrinsic growth rate and the carrying capacity, respectively, and which are assumed to
be strictly positive. For this specification both equations are third degree polynomials
in the variables x1 and x2: All the coefficients of the polynomials are zero if and only if
r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 0: Since ri; i ¼ 1; 2 are assumed strictly positive, we can conclude that if the
renovation functions follow logistic expressions, there is no efficient MPNE.
Second, we assume that the renovation functions are linear, that is, FiðxiÞ ¼
rixi; i ¼ 1; 2: In this case both equations are first degree polynomials in the variables
x1 and x2: Making the three coefficients of each polynomial (independent term, x1
and x2) null leads to six equations that involve the nineteen parameters of the model.
Because the complexity of the equations and because the number of parameters
are large, checking if the cooperative solution is a Nash equilibrium is not a
straightforward task. However, since the number of parameters is much greater than
the number of equations it is not difficult to find a set of values of the parameters
satisfying all of them. For example, a set of parameters associated with an efficient
MPNE can be found, fixing p1 ¼ p2; s ¼ 0; aij ¼ 1; gij ¼ 1 for i; j ¼ 1; 2; and
choosing
r1 ¼ 4 r2  r1; r2 ¼
1
8
ð32þ b22  21rÞ; b21 ¼ 8 b22 þ 24r1;
b12 ¼
1
324
½128þ 35b222 þ 12r1  63r21  4b22ð38þ 21r1Þ;
b11 ¼
1
324
½3584þ 35b222 þ 16428r21  4b22ð178þ 399r1Þ;
0ob22o13r1; r1 2 ð0; 0:911949Þ:
The last two inequalities ensure that parameters ri and bij are positive. Positive
values for the stationary state leading to an equilibrium state trajectory which
converges globally to the unique steady are guaranteed if one of the following
conditions on the parameters is satisfied:
(A) r1o0:2759
1 ð87r1 36þ 15r2Þob22o27r1 þ 3r2  5;(B)
W
the s3
1
15
ð39 87r1Þor2o
1
12
ð36 87r1Þ;
r140:2759
1ob22o27r1 þ 3r2  5;
1 ð6 27r1Þor2o
1 ð36 87r1Þ:ltonian of
oved, the3 12
ith this choice of the parameters, and since the concavity of the Hami
econd player with respect to his or her own control variables can be pr22
necessary condition (11) for this player is sufficient too, as we pointed out in Remark
4. Then, we have found a MPNE, given by the expressions (32) and (31), which
qualifies as a Pareto optimum. Let us note that in this example, the efficient MPNE is
not an absolute cooperative solution, since the necessary condition (11) is not
fulfilled for the first player. In fact, for the symmetric game it has been proved that
choosing linear renovation functions and looking for linear strategies there are no
solutions satisfying the necessary conditions for both players simultaneously. When
the renovation functions follow a logistic the same result applies if linear or
quadratic strategies are considered.5. ConclusionsWe have derived necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize MPNE being
Pareto efficient. The proposed method is based on the characterization of Markov
Nash equilibria as solutions to a system of quasilinear partial differential equations.
Our approach also uses a compatibility condition that makes it possible to verify the
existence of common solutions of several partial differential equations. For
differential games with unidimensional state and control variables, the non-
fulfillment of this compatibility condition provides a negative criterium based on a
full computational method, establishing that the Pareto optimum cannot be a Nash
equilibrium.
Even though the efficiency of Nash equilibria is not a common property, it is a
very desirable property, since it makes the efficient solution self-enforcing. We have
proved that there are interesting economic differential games, in particular, the
dynamic fishery games, that present this property, although they are non-cooperative
in its mode of play. We have also proved that it can be the case that the cooperative
solution can be achieved as an open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative
game, but not as a MPNE.
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